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GEOGRAPHY AND LAW
Bernhard Grossfald*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The central questions of comparative law are still unsolved: Which legal institutions in what legal cultures can be compared with each other in a
meaningful way? What can we learn from comparative law for the solution
of our own problems? 1
These questions are even more acute today than they were only a few
years ago when comparative law was still in its age of optimism. Comparative law was then widely regarded as an efficient tool for finding solutions
to our own legal questions within foreign legal systems. Today such optimism has faded and has even given way to a deep skepticism. This is indicated by speculations about "the law of the non-transferability oflaw." 2 We
are thus confronted with a new challenge, which makes it necessary to discuss again the possibilities and limits, the powers and failures of comparative law.3
The general trend today is to view the transferability of law as a function of political and economic similarities between legal cultures. The emphasis is on the social and political power structure, on the East-West and
North-South conflicts.4 Other authors emphasize the communality of cultural values,5 or the similarity of the "Weltbild." 6 All these aspects certainly have their merits, but they have even more serious limits. They
* Professor of Law, University of Muenster; Director, Institute of Comparative Law. Dr.
Juris. 1960, University of Muenster; LL.M. 1963, Yale University; Habilitation 1966, Tueb•
ingen. -Ed.
1. On the use of comparative law, see M. RHEINSTEIN, EINFUHRUNG IN DIE RECHTSVER·
GLEICHUNG 37 (1974); 1 K. ZWEIGERT & H. KOTZ, EJNFUHRUNG IN DIE RECHTSVER·
GLEICHUNG 12 (1971); Ancel, Valeur actuelle des eludes de droil compare, in XXTH CENTURY
COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW; LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HESSEL E. YNTEMA 15
(1961) [hereinafter cited as YNTEMA LEGAL ESSAYS]; Schmitthoff, .Die kiit!ftigen Alffgaben der
Rechtsvergleichung, 33 JZ 495 (1978).
2. See, e.g., Hiller, Language, Law, Sports and Culture: The Traniferability or Non-Transferability of Words, L!festyles, and Altitudes Through Law, 12 VAL. U.L. Rev. 433 (1978);
Wr6blewski, Problems of Incomparability in Comparative Law, 53 RJVISTA INTERNAZIONALE
DI FILOSOFIA DEL DIRITTO 92 (1976).
3. See generally L. FRIEDMAN, DAS RECHTSSYSTEM IM BLJCKFELD DER SOZIALWISSEN·
SCHAFTEN (1981).
4. o. KAHN-FREUND, ON USES AND MISUSES OF COMPARATIVE LAW 37 (1974); McWhinney, Toward the Scientific Study of Values in Comparative Law Research, in YNTEMA LEGAL
ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 29.
5. See, e.g., Constantinesco, .Der Rechtsbegr!ffin der Makro-Vergleichung, 80 ZVGLRW1ss
177 (1981); Constantinesco, Ideologie als dete_,:minierendes Element zur JJi/dung der Rechts•
kreise, 19 ZFRV 161 (1978); Constantinesco, Uber den Stil der "Stiltheorie" in der Rec/1tsvergleichung, 78 ZVGLRW1ss 154 (1979); Drobnig, The Comparability of Socialist and Non•
Socialist Systems of Law, 3 TEL AVN U. STUD. L. 45, 56 (1977).
6. See Wahl, Klimatische Ei,!fl/Jsse alffdie Entwicklung des Rechls in Ost und Wes/, in FEST•
SCHRIFT FUR PHILIPP MOHRING 1, 6 (1975).
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cannot explain why comparative law is so difficult even between Europe
and the United States, or between Continental Europe and England. Here
we find similar political structures, similar economic standards, shared cultural values - yet still very great difficulties when it comes to comparative
law.
George Bernard Shaw's view that England and the United States "are
two countries separated by a common language" is more true today than
ever. An American observer recently mentioned "the radical differences
between the legal systems of the United States and those of the Continent."7 Or to put it in poetry: "Born on the other side of the sea, we are as
different as people can be." 8 The same feelings prevail between the Continent and England. Both sides regard the other's law as "very different" to put it mildly - not to say "strange." The North Sea is probably no
longer "the best thing I know between France and England," as Douglas
Jerrold once said, but at least in law it might still be regarded, in Lewis
Carroll's words, as true that "the further off from England the nearer to
France."
So far, the present methods in comparative law have not sufficiently
explained these tensions. This leads to the suspicion that important factors
are often overlooked - probably because they are too apparent. These
factors include primarily the natural environment (particularly the geographical situation of a country), the climate, population density, and language and religion.9 These factors are of utmost importance in
comparative law. They are normally the first differences we are confronted
with when going abroad; as legal scholars, we must give them our intensive
attention.
This Article will discuss the relations between geography and law. I
have already discussed the subject of language and law elsewhere; 10 with
regard to religion and law, I refer the reader to the extensive writings of
Harold Berman. I I
II.

THE PIONEERS

The influence of geography on law was first emphasized by the French
legal philosopher Montesquieu. I 2 He saw the main hindrance for legal
transplants in the geographic-climatic character of any law. Pascal depicted
the geographic character of law more sarcastically:
[W]e see neither justice nor injustice which does not change its nature with
7. Aldisert, Rambling Through Continental Legal Systems, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 935, 935
(1982).
8. R. RODGERS & 0. HAMMERSTEIN, SOUTH PACIFIC 79 (act 1, scene 1) (1949).
9. See Stein, llses, Misuses-and Nonuses of Comparative Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 198,
199, 207 (1977).
10. Grossfeld, Sprache und Recht, 39 JZ I (1984).
11. See H. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION (1974); Berman, Theological Sources of the Western Legal Tradition, 46 REV. JuR. U.P.R. 371 (1979); Berman, The
Religious Foundations of Western Law, 24 CATH. U.L. REV. 490 (1975); Berman, The l'!fluence
of Christianity Upon the .Development of Law, 12 OKLA. L. REV. 86 (1959).
12. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, Books 14-18 (T. Nugent trans. 1949) (1st ed.
n.p. 1748).
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change in climate. Three degrees of latitude reverse all jurisprudence; a
meridian decides the truth. . . . A strange justice that is bounded by a
river! Truth on this side of the Pyrenees, error on the other side. 13
Despite these early recognitions and the later authority of Eugen Ehrlich, 14 the idea that geography conditions any legal culture faded into the
background. 15 This was probably caused by the increase in traffic, the rise
of technology, and the industrial revolution in general. These developments made the natural assumptions and limitations inherent in a legal order less visible. In today's age of environmental concerns, however, they
appear again before our eyes. Not too long ago, for instance, the West German Minister of the Interior explained that the use of unleaded gas could
not be made compulsory in West Germany, as it had been in the United
States and Japan. He pointed out that because the United States occupies
most of a continent and Japan is an island, neither country has to worry so
much about trips of its citizens into neighboring states and the availability
of leaded gas there. Thus, differences in geography help account for different legal rules.
Lately, Horst Neumann-Duesberg 16 and Eduard Wahl 17 have pointed
more specifically to the significance of geography for law, Wahl relying
heavily on suggestions made by Tetsuro Watsuji in his bookA Climate. 18
Hans Baade has applied similar ideas to problems of constitutional law. 19
Other pioneers include Langhans-Ratzeburg, who in 1928 coined the term
"geojurisprudence" (Geojurisprudenz),2° which mainly, but not exclusively,21 referred to the cartographic presentation of law, and Merk, who
spoke of "legal geography" (Rechtsgeographie) in 1926.22
Ill.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

Indeed, geography is fate.

Fate not only for a country but also for its

13. B. PASCAL, PENSEES Fragment 294, at 83-84 (W. Trotter trans. 1931) (1st ed. Paris
1670).
14. E. EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 505 (W, Moll
trans. 1936) (referring to the work of Frederic Le Play, which was based on investigations of
the local conditions of social life).
15. But see E. VON LASAULX, NEUER VERSUCH EINER ALTEN, AUF DIE WAHRHEIT DER
TATSACHEN GEGRUNDETEN PHJLOSOPHIE DER GESCHICHTE 82 (E. Thurner ed. 1952).
16. H. NEUMANN-DUESBERG, SPRACHE IM RECHT 20 (1949).
17. Wahl, supra note 6, at 1.
18. T. WATSUJI, A CLIMATE; A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY (1961); see also N. DJUVARA,
CIVILISATIONS ET LOIS HISTORIQUES (1975); Y. NODA, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE LAW 58
(1976); K. WITTFOGEL, DIE ORIENTALISCHE DESPOTIE (1962); von Bar, Die Entwicklung des
siidefrikanischen Zivilrechts dargestel/t an Fragen des Heftungsrechts, 42 RABELSZ 87, 98
(1978).
19. H. BAADE, DAS VERHALTNIS VON PARLAMENT UND REGIERUNG IM BEREICH DER
AUSWARTIGEN GEWALT DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 19, 21 (Veroffentlichungen des
Instituts f"tir Intemationales Recht an der Universitiit Kiel No. 46, 1962).
20. M. LANGHANS-RATZEBURG, BEGRIFF UND AUFGABEN DER GEOGRAPHISCHEN
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT (GEOJURISPRUDENZ) (1928). My acknowledgements to Hans w.
Baade, of Austin, Texas, for this pointer.
21. See M. LANGHANS-RATZEBURG, supra note 20, at 62.
22. See w. MERK, WEGE UND ZIELE DER GESCHICHTLICHEN RECHTSGEOGRAPHIE (1926).
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culture and its law. A paradigmatic example of geographic-climatic influence is the fact that the Islamic colonization in Spain has never passed the
boundary line of olive tree cultivation (41° latitude).23 Beyond that, the
geographic environment colors the law and enables or hinders the transfer
of legal institutions. This is obvious when looking at the extremes - for
example, the law of the Esk.imos24 or of desert peoples. The Supreme Court
of the Philippines expressed this in a very picturesque way by saying that
law often acquires "a characteristic coloring from the change of
environment."25
I became aware of this environmental context when investigating the
question of why English law is so "different." When I spoke to Kurt Lipstein in Cambridge about this issue, he answered: "Please don't forget there is always the Channel!" Certainly English law is influenced by the
Roman law and by the European ius commune of the Middle Ages, 26 but its
character is defined by the insular situation. That character is also a consequence of the early centralization brought about in London by the
Normans, a result of the strategic position of that city. The significance of
an insular position can be seen even more clearly in Japanese law.27
Once the idea of geography's significance has come up, the immediate
question is whether there is a general underlying principle. One first recalls
the claims of the anthropologists concerning the early territorial stamping
of human beings28 and the territorial principle in modem law. One is reminded of the geographically defined legal proverb in Frisia: "Wer nicht
will deichen, muss weichen" (whoever does not want to build a dike must
go). We think about construction codes in areas with earthquakes, or different zoning ordinances in areas with many or few sunny days, for example in Naples and Hamburg. But the influence of geography on law goes
even further. A classic example is the change English law underwent when
it was transferred to the United States.29
23. See 1 c.w. PREVITE-ORTON, THE SHORTER CAMBRIDGE MEDIEVAL HISTORY 372
(1952).
24. See E. HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN 67 (1954).
25. Javellana v. Mirasol, 40 Phil. Rpts. 761, 775 (Phil. Sup. Ct. 1920).
26. See A. EHRENZWEIG, PSYCHOANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE 110-15 (1971); Coquillette,
Legal Ideology and Incorporation (pts. I & II), 61 B.U. L. REv. 1, 315 (1981); see also Merryman, On the Convergence (and Divergence) ofthe Civil Law and the Common Law, 17 STAN.
J. INTL. L. 357 (1981).
27. See Kim & Lawson, The Law ofthe Subtle Mind: The Traditional Japanese Conception
of Law, 28 INTL. & COMP. L.Q. 491, 492-93 (1979).
28. See Abbas, Earliest hunters staked out boundaries, FORUM-SOUTHERN METHODIST
UNIVERSITY, Feb. 28, 1983, at 5, in which such research by Professor Sampson is reported. See
also J. WOHLWILL & G. WEISMAN, THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT AND BEHAVIOR: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY AND GUIDE TO THE LITERATURE 152 (1981); Cashdan, Territoriality
Among Human Foragers: Ecological Models and an Application to Four Bushman Groups, 24
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 47 (1983).
29. See, e.g., G. BAKKEN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW ON THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN FRONTIER: CIVIL LAW AND SOCIETY, 1850-1912 (1983); Wengler, Die Anpassung des Englischen
Rechts durch die Judikatur in den Vereinigten Staaten, in 1 FESTSCHRIFT FUR ERNST RABEL 39
(1954); see also M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977);
Holt, Morton Horwitz and the Transformation ofAmerican Legal History, 23 WM. & MARYL.
REV. 663 (1982); Williams, Book Review, 25 UCLA L. REV. 1187 (1978); Winship, Book Review, 31 Sw. L.J. 751 (1977). For a contrast to Horwitz's view of American legal history, see
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WATER LAWS

Let us take as a first example the water laws. The transfer of water
laws from a country with plenty of water (England) to the arid southwestern United States caused serious social tensions, eventually bringing about
a change in those laws. 30 What happened? While English common law
followed the riparian rights theory, giving rights to the water to the owner
of the land adjacent to the water, the courts of the West and Southwest
developed the law of appropriation. As a consequence of the motto "First
in time, first in right," those persons got priority who first made a "reasonable use" of the water. The reasons for this change can be found in a decision of the Supreme Court of Colorado from 1879:
The climate is dry, and the soil, when moistened only by the usual rainfall,
is arid and unproductive; except in a few favored sections, artificial irrigation for agriculture is an absolute necessity. Water in the various streams
thus acquires a value unknown in moister climates. . . . Deny the doctrine of priority or superiority of right by priority of appropriation, and a
great part of the value of all this property is at once destroyed.
We conclude, then, that the common law doctrine giving the riparian
owner a right to the fl.ow of water in its natural channel upon and over his
lands, even though he makes no beneficial use thereof, is inapplicable to
Colorado. Imperative necessity, unknown to the countries which gave it
birth, compels the recognition of another doctrine in conflict therewith. 31
Similar changes can be observed with regard to the law pertaining to
withdrawal of water from land. The English rule of unlimited withdrawal32 (from "England's green and pleasant land") 33 changed to the predominant American rule of a "reasonable use," taking account of a
"correlative right": water can only be taken out for a reasonable use balancing the consequences for the neighboring land.34
Kahn-Freund, English Law and American Law- Some Comparative Reflections, in EsSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE IN HONOR OF ROSCOE POUND 362 (R. Newman ed. 1962); Pound, The JJevel•
opment ofAmerican Law and Its JJevialionfrom English Law, 67 LAW. Q. REV. 49 (1951).
30. See Wengler, supra note 29, at 53; Wiel, F!fty Years of Water Law, 50 HARV. L. REV,
252 (1936); Williams, Optimizing Water Use: The Return Flow Issue, 44 U. COLO. L. Rev. 301
(1973). For a wide-ranging perspective, see M. HORWITZ. supra note 29, at 34. For modern
variations of these transfer problems, see Taubenfeld & Taubenfeld, Wind Energy: Legal Is•
sues and Legal Barriers, 31 Sw. L.J. 1053 (1977); Williams, Solar Access and Proper/)' Rights: A
Maverick Analysis, 11 CONN. L. REV. 430 (1979); Comment, The Allocation ofSunlight: Solar
Rights and the Prior Appropriation .Doctrine, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 421 (1976).
31. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446, 447 (1882).
32. See Acton v. Blundell, 12 Mees. & W. 324, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. Ch. 1843); see also
City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 292, 276 S.W.2d 798, 800, 801
(1955).
33. City of Pleasanton v. Lower Nueces River Supply Dist., 263 S.W.2d 797,800 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1953).
34. Basset v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569 (1862); see also W. PROSSER, SELECTED
TOPICS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 149-64, 171-72 (Univ. of Mich. Law School, Thomas M. Coo•
ley Lectures, Fourth Series, 1953).
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STRICT LIABILITY

But the effects of geography on law go still further. They explain, for
example, why the English rule in Rylands v. Fletcher 35 did not become the
law in Texas. According to the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, the owner of
land is responsible for damages resulting from the storage of water on his
land. The Supreme Court of Texas, however, did not accept this rule:
In Rylands v. Fletcher the court predicated the absolute liability of the
defendants on the proposition that the use of land for the artificial storage
of water was not a natural use, and that, therefore, the landowner was
bound at his peril to keep the waters on his own land. . . . This basis of
the English rule is to be found in the meteorological conditions which obtain there. England is a pluvial country, where constant streams and
abundant rains make the storage of water unnecessary for ordinary or
general purposes.36
The court was of the opinion that the situation in Texas was quite different
from the one in England:
A large portion of Texas is an arid or semi-arid region. West of the 98th
meridian of longitude, where the rainfall is approximately 30 inches, the
rainfall decreases until finally, in the extreme western part of the state, it is
only about 10 inches. This land of decreasing rainfall is the great ranch or
livestock region of the State, water for which is stored in thousands of
ponds, tanks, and lakes on the surface of the ground. The country is almost without streams; and without the storage of water from rainfall in
basins constructed for the purpose, or to hold waters pumped from the
earth, the great livestock industry of West Texas must perish. No such
condition obtains in England. With us the storage of water is a natural or
necessary and common use of the land, . . . and obviously the rule announced in Rylands v. Fletcher, predicated upon different conditions, can
have no application here. 37
As an additional argument the court referred to the special situation of
Texas as an oil producing state:
Again, in England there are no oil wells, no necessity for using surface
storage facilities for impounding and evaporating salt waters therefrom. In
Texas the situation is different. Texas has many great oil fields, tens of
thousands of wells in almost every part of the state. Producing oil is one of
our major industries. One of the by-products of oil production is salt
water, which must be disposed of without injury to property or the pollution of streams. The construction of basins or pounds [sic] to hold this salt
water is a necessary part of the oil business.38
VI.

FENCING IN, FENCING OUT

The fencing problem is, in my eyes, the most beautiful and most dramatic example of geographically enforced change in the law.39 This prob35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (1868).
Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 128 Tex. 155, 164, 96 S.W.2d 221, 225 (1936).
128 Tex. at 165, 96 S.W.2d at 226.
128 Tex. at 165-66, 96 S.W.2d at 226.
See generally D. MEINIG, IMPERIAL TEXAS: AN INTERPRETATIVE EsSAY IN CULTURAL
GEOGRAPHY (1969). My acknowledgements to Professor Joseph McKnight from the Law

1516

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 82:1510

lem developed in the middle of the last century in the Midwest and
Southwest of the United States as a struggle between ranchers and farmers
- the classic Cain-and-Abel conflict.40
Under the common law, ranchers had to "fence in" their cattle. 41 If the
ranchers failed to do so, they had to pay compensation for the damage done
by the cattle to their neighbors' fields. This rule meets the needs of a
densely populated country in which farming has to be protected and promoted as the most intensive form of agricultural production. Under different geographic conditions, however, the rule of "fencing in" changed into
its opposite, the rule of "fencing out."42
Some court decisions explain in detail the reasons behind this change.
For example, in 1948 the Supreme Court of Illinois said:
However well adapted the rule of the common law may be to a densely
populated country like England, it is surely but ill adapted to a new country like ours. If this common law rule prevails now, it must have prevailed
from the time of the earliest settlements in the State, and can it be supposed that when the early settlers of this country located upon the borders
of our extensive prairies, that they brought with them and adopted as applicable to their condition a rule of law, requiring each one to fence up his
cattle; that they designed the millions of fertile acres stretched out before
them to go ungrazed, except as each purchaser from government was able
to inclose his part with a fence? This State is unlike any of the eastern
states in their early settlement, because, from the scarcity of timber, it must
be many years yet before our extensive prairies can be fenced, and their
luxuriant growth sufficient for thousands of cattle must be suffered to rot
and decay where it grows, unless the settlers upon their borders are permitted to turn their cattle upon them.43
The court concluded that the common law rule "does not and never has
prevailed in lllinois."44
The consequence was that the farmer had to put up fences in order to
protect his fields against any damage from straying cattle ("fencing out").
As the Supreme Court of Kansas explained in 1869: "The owner of real
estate does not use reasonable and ordinary care and diligence to protect his
property from the intrusion of roaming cattle unless he incloses it with a
lawful fence." 45
The Supreme Court of the United States summarized this development
in 1890:
[The principle of the liability of the cattleowner] was ill-adapted to the
nature and condition of the country at that time. Owing to the scarcity of
School of Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas, for his very valuable suggestions.
Mr. McKnight placed material that he had collected at my disposal. See also Coase, The
Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J. L. & EcoN. 1 (1960). Coase uses the fencing problem to illustrate
his theorem.
40. See 3 DIE RELIGION IN GESCHICHTE UND GEGENWART, col. 1090 (3d ed. TUbingen
1959) (under the keyword "Kain und Abel").
41. See G. WILLIAMS, LIABILITY FOR ANIMALS (1939).
42. For details see J. INGHAM, THE LAW OF ANIMALS 258-69 (1900).
43. Seeley v. Peters, 10 ill. (5 Gilm.) 130, 142 (1848).
44. 10 Ill. (5 Gilm.) at 143.
45. Union Pac. Ry. v. Rollins, 5 Kan. 98, 104 (1869).
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means for enclosing lands, and the great value of the use of the public
domain for pasturage, it was never adopted or recognized as the law of the
country. . . . Indeed, it is only within a few years past, as the country has
been settled and become highly cultivated, all the land nearly being so
used by its owners or by their tenants, that the question of compelling the
owner of cattle to keep them confined has been the subject of agitation.46
Many prairie states enacted "fencing-out" statutes.47 Behind all this lay
the struggle for an open ranch,48 perceived by the "fencecutters" as vital to
bringing their cattle to the chief markets in the East, as well as to gaining
access to water. This struggle even became the theme of a popular song:
"Oh give me lands, lots of lands under starry skies above, don't fence me
in."
The legal situation differed in its details from state to state.49 However,
the general rule, which had once adopted "fencing out" over the common
law "fencing in," later changed back to "fencing in."50 The main reasons
for that reversal were the increase in population and the change in attitude
towards pastureland and farmland. Decisive, however, were three technical
developments: First, the railroad solved the problem of transportation and
made it possible to bring the wood needed for fences into the prairie states;
second, the invention of barbed wire in the 1870's allowed the fencing of
great areas, 51 and created fences that were strong enough to hold the halfwild longhorns; finally, arrival of the iron windmill made it possible to
pump up water wherever it was needed, so fences no longer blocked the
way to water. A reminder of this famous dispute still lives today. In the
musical Oklahoma by Rodgers and Hammerstein, this song can be heard:
The farmer and the cowman should be friends!
Oh, the farmer and cowman should be friends!
The one man likes to push a plow,
The other likes to chase a cow,
But that's no reason why they can't be friends!
46. Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 328 (1890); see also Lazarus v. Phelps, 152 U.S. 81
(1894); Garcia v. Sumrall, 58 Ariz. 526, 535, 121 P.2d 640, 644 (1942):
The result was that if the old co=on law rule of trespass was applied, it would have
been practically impossible to use these federal lands for grazing, for the animals running
at large thereon, due to their natural instincts, would be practically certain to trespass
upon any privately owned lands lying adjacent to the open range.
47. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 28, 1838, ch. 76, 1838 Ark. Laws 450; Act of Mar. 31, 1855, ch. 59,
1855 Cal. Stat. 70; Act of Jan. 11, 1866, ch. 15, 1865-1866 Dakota Laws 472; Act of Jan. 29,
1864, 1863 Idaho Laws 594; Act of Jan. 27, 1835, 1834-1835 Ill. Laws 144; Act of Feb. 5, 1840,
1839-1840 Tex. Laws 179. These statutes typically embrace a "fencing out" rule by stating that
a person could recover for damage caused by the trespassing animals of another !f his own
lands were enclosed by a sufficient fence. See Clarendon Land, Inv. & Ag. Co. v. McCelland,
89 Tex. 483, 34 S.W. 474 (1896); Ford v. Taggert, 4 Tex. 492 (1849).
48. See generally C. RICHTER, THE SEA OF GR.Ass (1937) (a novel dealing with open range
themes).
49. For an overview, see J. INGHAM, supra note 42, at 265-67.
50. See generally w. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORTS 706-07 (7th ed. 1982), for a brief overview of the "fencing in"/"fencing out" controversy in the United States.
51. See H. MCCALLUM & F. MCCALLUM, THE WIRE THAT FENCED THE WEST (1965);
Gates, The Devil's Rope, TEXAS HIGHWAYS, Sept. 1982, at 24; Kalez, Barbed Wire Benny, THE
CATTLEMAN, Jan. 1972, at 50.
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We may be tempted to regard these events as stories from the Wild West
that should not be taken too seriously. But it is startling that the norm of
"fencing out" was already part of the Spanish law when Texas still belonged to Mexico.52 This, however, must not induce the conclusion that the
Spanish example shaped the later American rule. 53 The American rule developed independently. Geography alone was decisive: it was stronger
than legal culture and history.
VIL

FURTHER EXAMPLES

Examples may be easily multiplied. Note, for instance, the difference
between the "incorporation theory" (England) and the "real seat theory"
(Continental Europe) in international company law. 54 These rules developed in different geographical environments and reflect their heritage even
today. The same is true for corporation laws in general, as can be seen by
looking at Delaware and Liechtenstein and comparing the characteristics of
their respective corporation laws. Similarly, geography influences the
choice of a particular tax system. Why else does the income tax preponderate in the United States, whereas the turnover tax is the major tax in Europe? The answer lies at least partly in geography: A turnover tax tends to
burden consumption and is thus the more appropriate tax for a culture that
puts a premium on savings in view of scarce natural resources - an approach that is typical of the European tradition. 55 The catch-phrases "tax
haven" and "off-shore funds" must also be mentioned in the context of geography and tax. These phrases actually connote the nature of a law by
reference to a particular geographic situation.
Another element in the influence of geography on law is the difference
in sheer size between countries, the feeling of seemingly inexhaustible land
reserves which informs, for instance, the American character and is a main
element of American law. It is also clear that an increase in population
increases the need for the legal protection of the private sphere, that formality becomes more important. 56 It makes a difference in law and social behavior when, instead of twenty-two persons (USA), two-hundred-fifty
persons (West Germany) live on one square kilometer.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

This short essay shows us that the relations between geography and law
- though so often overlooked - have far-reaching implications. Any in52. W. MYRES, THE RANCH IN SPANISH TEXAS, 1691-1800, at 25 (1969).
53. Jordan, The Origin ofAnglo-American Cattle Ranching in Texas: A J)ocumen/alion of
l)!Jfusionftom the Lower South, 45 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 63 (1969) (disputing the thesis accepted
by many that Anglo-American cattle ranchers in Texas learned from Mexican ranchers),
54. See, e.g., A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 14-16 (1976).
55. B. GROSSFELD, DIE EINKOMMENSTEUER 8 (Recht und Staat in Geschichte und
Gegenwart No. 504/505, 1981).
56. See generally Privacy as a Behavioral Phenomenon, 33 J. Soc. IssuES l (1977); see also
Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., 692 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426 (5th
Cir. 1981); Report of Committee A, 1980-81, 67 ACADEME Bulletin of the AAUP 176, 181-85
(1981) (Chairman of Committee, M. Finkin, commenting on judicially compelled disclosures
of decisions by academic bodies).
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depth comparative research must take this factor into account. We have to
be aware of the fact that a change in the geographical environment in itself
might change the function of a given legal institution. It is very difficult, if
not often impossible, to predict in which direction this change might go.
The conclusion is clear. Geographical factors can help us understand a
foreign law, but by the same token they make comparisons more difficult.
Comparative law offers no easy way to borrow solutions from other legal
cultures. There is, however, no reason to fall from exaggerated optimism
into complete pessimism. Notwithstanding all difficulties, we have quite a
few examples of successful legal transplants. Seeing the problems more
clearly is often the first step to coping with and overcoming them - though
the way may be long and hard.

